Connector
Google Workspace
OAuth connection, authorised by the client in their own tenant.
Reads two-factor authentication coverage and the domain's account hygiene.
01
What to create in the tool
The access is created in Google Workspace, not in Vigicap.
Where to generate it
The exact path through the vendor's console is not documented here to date. We are not describing it from memory: the vendor's own documentation is the authority.
Minimum role
The minimum role this connector needs is not documented to date. We would rather write that than guess it: an unverified claim about access rights ends up in front of a client's data protection officer, who is precisely the person who will check it. Refer to the vendor's documentation, which alone is authoritative on its role model.
02
What to enter in Vigicap
This connector asks for no additional field.
03
Per-client routing
The connection is made client by client: one credential per client, entered on that client's record. Nothing is shared between two clients, and disconnecting one leaves the other untouched.
04
What it does, and what it does not do
ISO 27001 controls covered
This connector's readings feed ${n} Annex A controls — derived from the ReCyF objectives above, not entered by hand.
- 5.15 Access control
- 5.16 Identity management
- 5.17 Authentication information
- 5.18 Access rights
- 6.5 Responsibilities after termination or change of employment
- 8.2 Privileged access rights
- 8.3 Information access restriction
- 8.5 Secure authentication
ReCyF objectives it pre-fills
A reading feeds one objective of the ANSSI ReCyF framework. It PROPOSES it: the level only counts once a consultant has confirmed it.
- #10 Gestion des identités et des accès des utilisateurs aux systèmes d'informationManagement of user identities and of user access to the information systems
Read-only
Vigicap writes nothing to the tool while reading.
How Vigicap handles your credentials.
Scopes requested
The exact scopes requested at authorisation, named as the vendor names them.
- openid
- https://www.googleapis.com/auth/admin.directory.user.readonly
Verification
This connector has been run end to end against a real instance of the tool, not merely tested against a mock.
What this connector reads, exactly
- A single endpoint: the domain's user directory, read-only.
- For each account, the 2-Step Verification (2SV) enrolment flag.
- From that, the connector derives 2SV coverage and account hygiene, using exactly the same thresholds as the Microsoft 365 connector — Google's 2SV is the direct equivalent of Microsoft's MFA registration, and no Google-specific tuning was introduced.
What it does not read
No Gmail, no Drive, no Calendar, no Chat. The three scopes requested are openid, email and the read-only directory: no content is reachable. And, unlike the Microsoft 365 connector, no device inventory: there is no Intune equivalent here, so no estate, no disk encryption, no antivirus state.
What these signals do not prove
- One ReCyF objective, not four. Where Microsoft 365 feeds four objectives, this one feeds a single objective: identity and access management. That follows directly from what it reads, and it is the sharpest difference between the two connectors.
- The flag read says a user enrolled in 2SV. It does not say 2SV is enforced on the domain: an enforcement policy cannot be inferred from an enrolment rate, even at 100%.
- The reading covers the directory as it is, not as it should be. An account that ought to have been deleted appears like any other — which is exactly what the account-hygiene review exists to catch, and that is consultant work, not connector work.
- Why does this connector read so much less than the Microsoft 365 one?
- Because it asks for much less: three scopes against nine. The difference is not a limitation of Google Workspace in general, it is the access perimeter this connector requests — the directory and nothing else.
- Is domain-enforced 2SV visible?
- No. The connector reads enrolment, account by account. A domain-level enforcement policy is separate information, to be checked in the admin console.
- Who grants the access, and how is it withdrawn?
- A super-administrator of the domain, by OAuth consent. Revocation happens in the Google admin console, without going through us.